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ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
 
 
 
 
Do international organizations (IOs) suffer from a deficit of accountability? Many people thinks so, 
but that is hardly surprising. After all, as Jonathan Koppell has noted wryly, ‘[n]o one will ever be 
criticised for excessive emphasis on accountability’.1 In relation to international organizations, the 
term ‘accountability’ has the rare distinction of being appealing both to analysts with a 
managerialist interest in organizational performance and to critical scholars bent on uncovering the 
deep power structures of world politics. Pollitt and Hupe place accountability among what they call 
‘magic concepts’:2 it has a very broad meaning, it is difficult to be against it, it suggests consensus 
in an otherwise highly divided field, and it is fashionable in academic, policy-making, and funding 
circles. It is therefore tempting to approach the topic of accountability and IOs by considering not 
the thing itself but discourses of accountability, and the interests and power they serve. Such 
discourses may then be interpreted as, for instance, a strategy of legitimization aimed at stabilizing 
control and domination in a turbulent environment, or as a manifestation of ‘governmentality’.3 
However, this chapter is based on the assumption that accountability is a genuinely useful analytical 
tool that can help scholars capture certain relationships of communication and power better than 
other concepts. In other words, if done properly, conceptualizing certain social interactions as 
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accountability relationships may illuminate, rather than obfuscate, their core features, dynamics, 
and implications. 
The conceptual aspects of accountability are less vague and contested than sometimes 
believed. To be sure, the most influential analytical frameworks and typologies are not identical and 
it is worthwhile discussing their respective merits and potential for synthesis. However, a key point 
of this chapter is that the research questions deserving most intense theoretical and empirical 
attention are, first, who should be accountable to whom and, second, to what extent they actually 
are. The chapter outlines some approaches to answering these questions, highlights what I would 
consider to be the most promising one, and sketches the contours of a possible solution to a major 
problem that plagues that approach. 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTABILITY 
The potential contribution of the concept of accountability to the study of IOs has been enhanced by 
some compatible attempts at defining accountability in an analytically useful way. Since 
international organizations are international and organizations, the academic disciplines that are 
most interested in them are international relations, public administration studies, and public law. In 
recent years, there has been a remarkable degree of convergence in the basic conceptualization of 
accountability among accounts that have been influential in their respective fields.
4
 In a relatively 
recent but already influential article, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane suggest that 
accountability includes three elements: 
first, standards that those who are held accountable are expected to meet; second, 
information available to accountability holders, who can then apply the standards in 
question to the performance of those who are held to account; and third, the ability of 
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these accountability holders to impose sanctions—to attach costs to the failure to 
meet the standards.
5
 
In a similar vein, Mark Bovens writes that ‘Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.’6 Using an element 
from Buchanan and Keohane’s conceptualization, we can add to Bovens’s definition that the 
justification of the conduct needs to occur with reference to standards that both the actor and the 
members of the forum are aware of and (ideally) recognize as legitimate. Accountability is mainly 
an ex post mechanism of control, but prior common knowledge of the conditions of its exercise is 
crucial for the kind of effect it has on behaviour. Indeed, the fact that standards of judgement are 
known to both power-wielder and accountability-holder in advance is one of the features that 
distinguishes accountability from unpredictable and arbitrary punishment. 
There is also a relatively high level of agreement at a lower level of conceptual abstraction, 
namely with respect to the identification and classification of different forms or types of 
accountability mechanisms. For instance, from the perspective of public administration Romzek and 
Dubnick identified ‘bureaucratic’, ‘legal’, ‘professional’, and ‘political’ accountability.7 From the 
perspective of global politics, Grant and Keohane list seven mechanisms of accountability: 
‘hierarchical’, ‘supervisory’, ‘fiscal’, ‘legal’, ‘market’, ‘peer’, and ‘public reputational’.8 Bovens 
has developed one of the most sophisticated classifications of accountability forms, which is based 
on four dimensions: depending on the nature of the forum, accountability can be political, legal, 
administrative, professional, or social; depending on the nature of the actor, accountability can be 
corporate, hierarchical, collective, or individual; depending on the nature of the conduct, 
accountability can be financial, procedural, or for products; and depending on the nature of the 
nature of the obligation, accountability can be vertical, horizontal, or ‘diagonal’, namely indirectly 
linked to a hierarchical relationship.
9
 
The definitions and typologies proposed by the authors cited and by others do not coincide 
perfectly, but they have enough in common to suggest that research on IO accountability need not 
be hindered by conceptual incommensurability. It is encouraging that, on the whole, the debate on 
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specific forms of accountability fruitfully revolves around substantive rather than conceptual 
disagreements. A few examples must suffice. Legal scholars disagree on how, and indeed whether, 
IOs and their staffs should be subject to legal accountability for their operations and specifically for 
their involvement in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict administration.
10
 A debate concerns 
the effectiveness of administrative accountability mechanisms such as the World Bank Inspection 
Panel.
11
 An emerging literature in political science analyses the political accountability of IO 
bureaucracies to member states through the lens of principal–agent theory.12 One of the most 
important fields of research in global governance examines whether, when, and how civil society 
organizations can function as channels of accountability between global power-holders and those 
who are subject to global policies.
13
 
An important debate concerns the question of whether multiplying the actors to whom (and 
forums in which) IOs owe accountability improves or hinders their effectiveness in eliciting 
compliance and/or solving the problems that motivated their creation.
14
 Jonathan Koppell has made 
an important recent contribution to the debate by applying a theoretical framework to twenty-five 
governmental and non-governmental global governance organizations.
15
 His main thesis is that 
these organizations struggle to balance two conflicting imperatives, and that this dilemma puts a 
stable solution of the problem of accountability out of reach. On the one hand, their perceived 
normative legitimacy depends on their conformity to governance norms imported from their 
democratic member states: the structure and decision-making of IOs must be perceived as based on 
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 Koppell, World Rule. 
clear and impartial rules, equal representation and participation, and the achievement of goals that 
are equally valued by all members. Koppell links these desiderata to a dimension of accountability 
that he calls ‘responsibility’. On the other hand, the pragmatic authority of IOs—understood as the 
extent to which the rules created by the IOs affect the actual behaviour of those to whom they are 
addressed—depends on the satisfaction of the vital interests of ‘vital’ members, namely those 
whose market position or other sources of power gives them a credible option to stay out of, or 
leave, the organization. Koppell notes that the satisfaction of the preferences of those key members 
is also in the interest of other members, because rules that fail to be adopted by the former bring no 
or limited benefits to everyone else. For Koppell, the need to satisfy the demands of powerful 
members compels IOs to emphasize a dimension of accountability that he calls ‘responsiveness’. 
While in some contexts legitimacy and authority reinforce one another, he argues that the 
specificities of global governance organizations commonly create a tension between the demands of 
normative legitimacy and pragmatic authority, and hence between accountability as responsibility 
and accountability as responsiveness. This tension is reflected in the way organizations are 
structured, in the way they create rules, and in the way they promote adherence to those rules. 
Koppell’s theoretical and empirical analysis significantly advances the debate on IO 
accountability. However, two of his analytical moves are not quite persuasive. The first concerns 
the posited symmetry between the legitimacy–authority conflict and the responsibility–
responsiveness conflict. In so far as the responsibility dimension of accountability is conceived as 
being constrained by laws and rules, as Koppell does, in most cases it may be plausible to identify it 
with equality and impartiality (although occasionally laws formalize inequality, as the United 
Nations (UN) Charter provisions on the UN Security Council do). But in so far as the 
responsiveness dimension of accountability is conceived as attention to the demands of the 
constituencies being served, there is no logical link between this dimension and the unequal 
treatment of different constituencies. In other words, responsiveness can be either impartial or 
biased, and it seems problematic to conflate the question ‘accountable for what?’ (attention to 
demands) with the question ‘accountable to whom?’ (the ‘vital’ members). Koppell’s overall 
analysis confirms the view that the latter question is the crucial source of tensions in global 
governance. 
The second aspect of Koppell’s account that raises questions is his conceptualization of 
normative legitimacy. It is said to entail a commitment of the ‘one state, one vote’ rule and other 
design features aimed at promoting equal influence among IO members. Koppell refers to them as 
‘democratic principles’ and attributes their influence to the governance norms prevailing in 
democratic member states. However, as he himself notes, equal representation for geographic 
constituencies of unequal size is often considered an undemocratic element in existing democracies. 
When it exists, most notably in federal states, it is often tolerated in the name of principles other 
than democracy. Moreover, the governance norms prevalent in democratic member states assume 
that the constituent units are themselves democratically representative, which is not the case with 
regard to many member states of IOs. The non-democratic nature of some members can be used to 
challenge their right to an equal influence on the IOs. Hence, the normative legitimacy of the ‘one 
state, one vote’ and similar rules does not seem to be rooted in democratic domestic norms, but 
rather in the norm of the sovereign equality of states, which is meant to confer rights irrespective of 
size and domestic institutions. But the uneasy coexistence of democracy norms and sovereign 
equality norms as foundations for normative legitimacy opens the possibility that that tensions 
between alternative legitimacy principles can be as severe as the tension between legitimacy and 
authority that Koppell emphasizes. That tension highlights the crucial role of the question 
‘accountable to whom?’ This question is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND DELEGATION AS BASES FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
A good starting point to consider the ‘accountable to whom?’ question is the distinction between 
two ‘basic models’ of accountability made by Grant and Keohane: the participation model and the 
delegation model. The authors note that the two models ‘differ fundamentally in their answer to the 
question: ‘Who is entitled to hold the powerful accountable?’ In the participation model, the 
performance of power-wielders is evaluated by those who are affected by their actions. In the 
delegation model, by contrast, performance is evaluated by those entrusting them with powers’.16 
As noted earlier, sovereign equality of states is sometimes considered a normatively desirable and 
important feature of world politics. A preference for the delegation model of accountability can be 
seen as a reflection of the value of sovereign equality, since IOs are often seen as having authority 
on certain matters because and in so far as it has been delegated to them by states. 
Judgements on the roots and severity of the ‘accountability deficit’ in global governance 
vary greatly depending on whether the delegation or the participation model is employed.
17
 Grant 
and Keohane note that within democratic states the same mechanisms of accountability, such as 
elections, can be justified both in terms of the participation and the delegation models, with no 
conflict between them. By contrast, in global politics there is ‘a fundamental tension between 
claims derived from delegation models and claims derived from participation models of 
accountability.’18 This tension partly emerges because the delegation model can accommodate 
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major structural inequalities of power: Grant and Keohane refer to the example of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) being particularly accountable to their largest 
shareholder—a state of affairs that is more justifiable from the perspective of the delegation model, 
or at least some versions of it, than from the perspective of the participation model. 
The distinction between participation and delegation is a fruitful way to approach the 
question of which systems of accountability raise the normative legitimacy of IOs, and it can inspire 
several research agendas. One research agenda would examine the attitudes of various categories of 
people (policy-makers, elites, ordinary citizens, etc.) and ascertain who makes legitimacy 
judgements on the basis of a participation frame and who makes them in accordance with a 
delegation frame. Within this agenda, analysts can identify abstract criteria that help structure 
surveys or interview questionnaires, but whether and how those criteria are applied by respondents 
is ultimately an empirical matter. A different research agenda would start by providing a 
philosophical justification for one of the two models in the context of global politics, then identify 
what legitimate distribution of opportunities for holding power-holders accountable that model 
would entail, and only then move onto the empirical level and examine how various existing IOs 
fare with respect to those criteria.
19
 
The remainder of this chapter contributes to the latter research agenda and focuses 
specifically on the challenge of operationalizing the participation model for the assessment of the 
quality of accountability of actual IOs. There are three reasons for focusing theoretical and 
empirical efforts in this direction. First, and most subjectively, the participation model is closest to 
the value orientation of the present author, which is inspired by cosmopolitan theory.
20
 Second, the 
obstacles to the application of accountability mechanisms based on the participation model at the 
global level, notably the absence of a ‘global public’ emphasized by Grant and Keohane, are 
certainly real but probably not as damaging as those authors maintain.
21
 
Third, the participation model is an increasingly important influence on the attitudes of 
international organization staff, policy-makers, civil society organizations, and citizens. I have no 
hard data to support this conjecture, but circumstantial evidence seems to point towards a trend. 
Thérien and Bélanger Dumontier show how the notion of global democracy and various policy 
implications attached to it rose to prominence in both the discourse and the policies of the UN 
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Secretariat during the 1990s and 2000s.
22
 UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali noted in 1995 that, 
‘A few years ago, no one ever spoke of making the United System more democratic. Today, the 
question is on every agenda.’23 The UN General Assembly passed several resolutions (by majority 
vote) proclaiming ‘the right to equitable participation of all, without any discrimination, in domestic 
and global decision-making’.24 Other developments are less explicit but still important. Grant and 
Keohane note that: 
the World Bank (2000) acknowledges the importance of ‘empowerment’ of poor 
people in order to increase the ‘accountability and responsiveness’ of public sectors 
to them. The language of empowerment suggests a participatory model of 
accountability, the logic of which could easily be extended to imply more 
empowerment within the Bank itself for the people who are affected by its policies, 
whether they are represented through state leaders or NGOs. 
Finally, attempts to determine the level of ‘democracy’ of countries are usually based on criteria 
determined by researchers rather than on what ‘public opinion’ or political actors think about the 
democratic quality of institutions and political processes,
25
 and a similar method seems legitimate 
for the analysis of the participatory quality of accountability in IOs. 
 
A WAY FORWARD FOR ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED 
INTERESTS 
Using the participation model to assess the quality of accountability of a given IO encounters an 
obvious problem: ‘having the right to participate in politics as an affected party is ambiguous at the 
global level’.26 The difficulty of identifying who is affected by the decisions of a power-wielder, or 
affected in a way that justifies a participatory entitlement, is a recurring theme in the literature on 
the so-called ‘all-affected principle’. Recent discussions of the principle owe much to the influence 
of Robert Dahl, who expressed it as, ‘Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government 
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should have the right to participate in that government’ and opined that, for all its problems, it ‘is 
very likely the best general principle of inclusion that you are likely to find’.27 
The all-affected principle can be specified in many ways, which tend to cluster into two 
broad approaches. The more restrictive approach to the notion of affectedness equates it to being a 
target of laws that create obligations for individuals and that can be coercively enforced on them. 
The idea that individuals subject to such laws should have the opportunity to participate in their 
making is more accurately referred to as the ‘all-subjected principle’ or ‘subject-to-the-law 
principle’.28 Arguably the all-subjected principle is relevant to some IOs. The clearest case is 
probably the UN Security Council, whose resolutions adopted under the authority of the UN 
Charter can legally require member states to adopt laws and regulations that impinge on the rights 
and obligations of people within their jurisdiction. For instance, the Security Council requires states 
to freeze the financial assets of people suspected to have links with terrorism, with no guarantee of 
due process. An element of legal accountability emerged gradually, as a targeted individual 
obtained from the European Court of Justice a ruling against European Union (EU) and UK 
measures based on the Security Council’s decision.29 However, the liability aspect of accountability 
is limited to encountering legal obstacles to the implementation of preferred policies. Other cases of 
law-making by IOs would trigger participatory entitlement under the all-subjected principle. 
However, the all-subjected principle seems too restrictive a basis for assessing the accountability of 
IOs. Most instances of international law become binding only after states have ratified and/or 
transposed them, and so it is not clear whether accountability of IOs is necessary beyond the 
accountability of individual member states. Even more importantly, IOs create policies and rules 
that do not qualify as laws but which are widely seen as giving rise to accountability claims: the 
decisions by the World Bank and the IMF on their conditional lending policies and the agreements 
they conclude with governments are prominent examples. 
It seems therefore that the application of the participation model to IOs needs to be based on 
an understanding of affectedness that is broader than being subject to law and that includes being 
causally affected by decisions and policies. Goodin is a vocal defender of the principle, but he has 
also demonstrated its expansionary tendencies. He shows that the most coherent and cogent 
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interpretation of the principle is that a say should be given to anyone who might possibly (or 
probably) be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda, and not just those 
who are actually affected by the course of action actually decided upon. He also notes that the 
logical implication of this interpretation may well be that virtually everyone in the world should be 
entitled to vote on any proposal or any proposal for proposals.
30
 
The expansionary implications of the all-affected principle have led some authors to 
question its appropriateness for assessing accountability relationships. For instance, Keohane points 
out that: ‘Merely being affected cannot be sufficient to create a valid claim. If it were, virtually 
nothing could ever be done, since there would be so many requirements for consultation, and even 
veto points.’31 The goal of using the principle to assess accountability deficits in IOs would be 
unattainable if the yardstick became impossibly demanding. The rest of this section tries to develop 
a solution to this predicament. 
If we follow Goodin and interpret the principle as mandating that a say should be given to 
anyone who might probably be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda, 
then the content of decisions cannot be used to differentiate between persons or groups entitled to 
participation and those who are not. This is because the content of a decision will depend on who is 
included and thus it cannot help determining who is to be included. But the amount of power 
wielded by decision-makers matters, because the more powerful an actor is, the more likely it is to 
have a significant impact on the lives of a broader set of people. In short, more power requires 
accountability to a wider circle of people.
32
 But what does this mean for IOs? 
Let’s start by considering different dimensions of policy-making in the global arena. 
Broadly speaking, policy-making entails (a) the framing of policy problems and the setting of 
policy agendas, (b) the creation or selection of the IO or other polity meant to address that policy 
problem, (c) the development and choice of policies made within that IO, and (d) the 
implementation of the policies by the agents of the IO. While this list is similar to those developed 
in the ‘policy stages’ literature, it is important to bear in mind that these are not necessarily 
sequential stages, and that significant feedback loops exist between them. The key point for our 
purposes is that, in different ways, decisions made in relation of one of these dimensions have the 
effect of limiting the power that decision-makers can exercise in relation to other dimensions. 
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Limits on power (in the form of material resources, legal mandate, etc.) restrict the effective range 
of options that actors can choose from. 
Three sets of relationships are especially relevant. (1) Decisions made with regard to policy 
implementation are constrained by the choice of policy instruments. For instance, if policy-makers 
decide to promote certain behavioural changes by changing laws rather than allocating material 
resources, those in charge of implementation will have to devote scarce resources to monitoring and 
enforcement activities rather than offer conditional transfers and services to the targets of the 
interventions. (2) Decisions made with regard to policy choice are constrained by decisions about 
the features of the IO within which those choices are made. For instance, if an IO has not explicitly 
been endowed with the authority to create binding international law, normally this option will not 
be on the agenda of policy-makers working within that IO. Similarly, if the ‘constitution’ of the IO 
requires unanimity among all members for major policy decisions, then this limits de facto the 
range of policies that can realistically be chosen during the ‘regular’ policy-making process. (3) 
Decisions with regard to the nature of the policy problem place significant constraints on all other 
dimensions of policy, and specifically on the creation or selection of the relevant IO. 
This focus on power and constraints allows us to develop an approach to specifying 
accountability entitlements that preserves the intuitively appealing aspects of the all-affected 
principle without succumbing to the counterintuitive implication that virtually everyone in the 
world should be equally able to hold any person involved in an IO accountable for any aspect of 
their work. The approach is based on the following propositions: 
 The process of framing policy problems determines the definition of global priorities 
and thus the allocation of global efforts and resources among a wide variety of 
possible uses. Global priority-setting presumably affects virtually everyone in the 
world, hence the all-affected principle mandates an accountability regime that is as 
inclusive as possible. This obligation concerns less the ‘invention’ of policy frames 
than the selection of priorities for global action. However, problem-framing and 
prioritization tend to be diffuse processes and this hinders the identification of 
power-holders and the creation of institutionalized mechanisms of accountability. 
 The process of creating and selecting IOs is influenced by the way that policy 
problems have been framed, but power-wielders can still choose among a wide range 
of IO designs, including some with significant depth and scope of authority. Like 
priority-setting, IO selection affects virtually everyone in the world, hence the all-
affected principle would require an accountability regime that is as inclusive as 
possible. Moreover, IO selection and design is not as diffuse a process as problem-
framing, and hence it is feasible to identify power-holders and imagine how 
institutionalized mechanisms of accountability for polity selection could be designed. 
 IO design creates procedural and substantive constraints on the range of policies that 
can be chosen by policy-makers. These constraints typically restrict the set of people 
who will probably be affected by the policies decided within the IO. One reason for 
this is that the IO may be expected to address only a limited number of policy issues, 
which are likely to have a significant impact only on certain communities but not on 
others. Another reason is that the IO may be under tight constraints with regard to its 
ability to extract and allocate resources, which in turn limits its ability to affect the 
interests of many people. The narrower the range of policies that an IO can 
effectively choose, the smaller the circle of those who have a valid claim to an 
accountability entitlement. 
 The choice of policies limits the courses of action of decision-makers who are 
responsible for policy implementation. For instance, those decision-makers may 
have a limited amount of material resources to be spent to the benefit of a 
circumscribed set of beneficiaries according to specific guidelines. In such cases, the 
set of people who will probably be affected by their decisions may well be relatively 
small. Policy-implementers should typically be accountable to fewer people than 
policy-makers. 
What do these abstract and general propositions mean for the empirical study of accountability 
deficits in IOs? Several guidelines can be derived from them. (1) Researchers should examine who 
is affected by IO selection and design given the policy problem as it has been defined. Then they 
should assess to what extent (and how) those stakeholders can actually hold power-wielders 
accountable for the selection and design of IOs. (2) Researchers should examine who is affected by 
policy choice given the IO as it has been created or selected. Then they should assess to what 
extent (and how) those stakeholders can actually hold accountable the power-wielders involved in 
policy choice. (3) Researchers should examine who is affected by policy implementation given the 
policies as they have been chosen. Then they should assess to what extent (and how) those 
stakeholders can actually hold accountable the power-wielders involved in policy implementation. 
Establishing guidelines for the analysis of policy problem-framing is more difficult than 
with the other dimensions, because of the highly diffuse and fluid nature of the process. Researchers 
from a variety of traditions agree that influence on policy-framing is highly unequal and 
concentrated in the Global West,
33
 but in practice it may be impossible to identify ex ante actors 
with a disproportionate capacity to influence global discourses and norms before they are 
instantiated in specific IOs and policies.
34
 A more practicable route is to identify the sources of 
systematic biases in the formation of global discourses, which allow some of them to become 
dominant without being thoroughly challenged by alternative discourses in an efficient 
‘marketplace of ideas’ or a Habermasian ‘ideal speech situation’. 
In the light of these considerations, it becomes clear that the selection and design of IOs 
plays a special role in overall assessments of accountability. On the one hand, power in problem-
framing is often too diffuse to allow an ex ante identification of the main power-wielders; and, on 
the other hand, policy-making within IOs is generally heavily constrained by prior decisions made 
with regard to IO design. For instance, decisions taken within the World Health Organization 
(WHO) may be much less consequential than decisions about the WHO taken by governments. 
Focusing on accountability for the selection and design of IOs also has the advantage of attracting 
the attention on the behaviour of the most powerful actors in global politics—usually the 
governments of large industrial countries. There is little doubt that their power within IOs is 
important, but their ability to determine the power of IOs is usually even more consequential. This 
orientation is especially useful if we consider that criticisms of IO accountability often target 
bureaucrats, who are often relatively powerless and/or constrained. 
 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE APPROACH: GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY 
To show how the framework outlined in the previous section can be used to assess specific IOs, this 
section sketches its application to the domain of IOs addressing global health issues, with special 
attention to the WHO and a sui generis IO, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria (Global Fund). The aim of this section is to provide a concrete illustration of the questions 
to be asked in empirical research, rather than comprehensive and definitive answers. We need ask 
two questions for each of the four dimensions highlighted above (agenda setting, design, policy-
making, and implementation). First, which actors wield significant power in relation to that specific 
dimension? Second, to what extent and how are those actors accountable to the people who are 
most affected by their decisions? We consider the four dimensions in turn. 
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The Framing of Policy Problems and the Setting of Policy Agendas. 
The context in which health-oriented IOs have operated in the past twenty years has been shaped by 
some powerful new frames. Three of them deserve special mention: the ‘emerging diseases frame’, 
the ‘AIDS exceptionalism frame’, and the ‘securitization’ frame. The founding moment of the 
‘emerging diseases’ frame can be traced back to a conference co-sponsored by the National 
Institutes of Health and Rockefeller University in May 1989. The conference addressed ‘emerging 
viruses’, a concept introduced by the conference chair Stephen S. Morse to encompass new 
pathogens such as HIV, Ebola, hantaviruses, as well as antimicrobial-resistant strains of familiar 
organisms.
35
 What King calls an ‘emerging diseases worldview’ came to dominate American 
understandings of international health over the next decade. The world-view was articulated and 
diffused most effectively by the Institute of Medicine (IoM) of the National Academy of Science, 
notably through two reports published in 1992 and 1997 respectively. The 1992 IoM report (titled 
Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States) presented an extensive 
discussion of the factors leading to the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases, dividing 
them into six categories: human demographics and behaviour, technology and industry, economic 
development and land use, international travel and commerce, microbial adaptation and change, and 
breakdown of public health measures. Among the measures recommended by that report were the 
establishment of an effective global surveillance network on emerging infectious diseases, with four 
components: a mechanism for detecting new or unusual diseases; laboratories capable of identifying 
and characterizing infectious agents; an information system to analyse and disseminate data; and a 
response mechanism for providing feedback to reporting agencies and for mobilizing investigative 
and control efforts of local and international agencies. 
The IoM reports were a particularly influential part of a broader movement that has been 
described as a shift toward a ‘paradigm of global health’ on the part of US public health policy-
makers.
36
 In the mid-1990s, the National Intelligence Council, the Centres for Disease Control 
(CDC), and the National Science and Technology Council produced reports expressing similar 
positions as the IoM. In 1995 the CDC launched the journal Emerging Infectious Diseases, and the 
following year thirty-six medical journals in twenty-one countries agreed to publish special issues 
or articles on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases.
37
 While this movement was complex 
and different actors emphasized different aspects of the emergent disease paradigm, it shared a 
common ideational core: a number of factors, some of which connected with globalization, are 
                                                          
35
 Nicholas B. King, ‘Security, Disease, Commerce Ideologies of Postcolonial Global Health’, 
Social Studies of Science 32/5–6 (2002): 763–89. 
36
 Supinda Bunyavanich and Ruth B. Walkup, ‘US Public Health Leaders Shift Toward a New 
Paradigm of Global Health’, American Journal of Public Health 91/10 (2001): 1556–8. 
37
 King, ‘Security, Disease, Commerce Ideologies of Postcolonial Global Health’. 
creating an epidemiologically borderless world that threatens the vital interests of the United States 
and other developed countries. Since physical cordons sanitaires are largely ineffective in dealing 
with the new challenge, developed countries should promote and support the creating of a global 
surveillance system that can provide what King calls ‘informational cordons’—that is, mechanisms 
able to detect possible risks as soon as they emerge anywhere in the world and to contain outbreaks 
before they spread globally. 
The second frame is what is sometimes referred to as ‘AIDS exceptionalism’.38 It posits that 
AIDS represents an exceptional global threat demanding an exceptional global response. In the 
words of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS): 
The AIDS pandemic is as serious a threat to humanity’s prospects for progress and 
stability as global warming or nuclear proliferation. It is exceptional in its scale, 
complexity and the consequences across generations, in severity, longevity and its 
impact. It can only be defeated with sustained attention and the kind of ‘anything it 
takes’ resolve that Member States apply to preventing global financial meltdowns or 
wars.
39
  
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also stressed the exceptionality of the disease: ‘AIDS is a new 
type of global emergency—an unprecedented threat to human development requiring sustained 
action and commitment over the long term.’40 
A third, and related frame, is securitization—that is, the process by which a policy problem 
is transformed into a security threat.
41
 In the late 1990s, sectors of the US security policy 
communities came to accept and propagate the argument that infectious diseases represent a threat 
to American security interests. Foreign policy think-tanks published reports on the security/global 
health nexus—for instance, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Milbank Memorial Fund 
published a report on Why Health Is Important to US Foreign Policy in 2001. Probably the most 
consequential expression of the new interest in infectious disease among security experts and 
policy-makers was the declassified intelligence estimate on The Global Infectious Disease Threat 
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and Its Implications for the United States produced by the National Intelligence Council in 2000, 
which reviewed a number of developments and scenarios and concluded that: 
New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat and 
will complicate US and global security over the next 20 years. These diseases will 
endanger US citizens at home and abroad, threaten US armed forces deployed 
overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions 
in which the United States has significant interests. 
The process of securitization extended beyond the United States. In January 2000 the UN Security 
Council devoted a session exclusively to the threat to Africa from HIV/AIDS. Following 9/11, 
Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States launched a Global Health Security Initiative, which linked the threat of 
international biological, chemical, and radio-nuclear terrorism to the goal of strengthening public 
health preparedness. 
These developments, which decisively shaped the agenda of institutional reform and 
innovation in the 1990s and 2000s, illustrate very well the difficulty of assessing accountability for 
how policy problems are framed. Promoters of the frames included epidemiologists and other 
scientists from some the world’s most authoritative health research and policy institutions, notably 
the CDC and WHO. These scientists commanded global reputations and often extensive funding for 
biomedical research on infectious diseases. They gained a number of allies, notably among military 
planners, makers of foreign policy, and the media. News corporations are interested in highlighting 
the emergence of novel, mysterious, and dangerous diseases. Journalistic accounts such as Richard 
Preston’s The Hot Zone (1994) and Laurie Garrett’s The Coming Plague (1994) helped create what 
Tomes calls a ‘germ panic’ among the American public.42 These individuals and organizations 
arguably exercised what Barnett and Duvall call ‘productive power’, which ‘concerns discourse, the 
social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, 
experienced, and transformed’.43 But the diffuse nature of such processes inevitably implies 
fragmented accountability, if any. To the extent that the frames were promoted by medical experts, 
a key mechanism of accountability was reputational: assertions that could not be supported by the 
standards of argument and evidence generally accepted by the scientific community risked being 
discredited.
44
 Boards of institutions such as the IoM and editorial boards of peer-reviewed scientific 
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 Even staunch critics of conventional approaches such as Paul Farmer conceded that ‘The research 
and action programs elaborated in response to the perceived emergence of new infections have, by 
journals exercised a controlling role. In the case of governmental institutions such as the CDC, loss 
of scientific reputation may lead to funding cuts and political interventions. It is notable that these 
mechanisms of accountability operated mainly within a country (the United States). However, 
WHO staff was also heavily involved in promoting the frames, which involved them in the 
accountability relationships that are typical of established IOs (see below). 
It is also important to note that attempts to exercise productive power can fail because of 
‘checks and balances’ (rather than accountability) mechanisms. In particular, the securitization 
frame has been contested. An example of this opposition is the Intergovernmental Meeting (IGM) 
on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, which was convened in November 2007 to address a crisis in 
the vaccine sharing arrangement managed by the WHO. The crisis was triggered by the Indonesian 
government’s decision in early 2007 to stop sharing influenza virus samples with the WHO and its 
request that vaccines developed from Indonesian samples would be sold to Indonesia at discounted 
prices. In a tense IGM, the EU delegates attempted to include a reference to ‘global health security’ 
in the official statement of the meeting, as well as a reference to ‘international regulations’—
namely the newly revised International Health Regulations (IHR). But several representatives from 
developing countries rejected the inclusion of global health security in the statement, which was 
dropped after lengthy discussions. One of the opponents was the representative of Brazil, who 
declared that Brazil ‘was not committed to working under the security concept’.45 
 
The Selection and/or Design of IOs. 
The framing of the policy problem constrained the range of institutional solutions that policy-
makers were prepared to consider. The focus on emerging diseases and the exceptional threat posed 
by HIV/AIDS resulted in some organizational changes in the WHO as well as the creation of new 
organizations, most importantly the Global Fund. With regard to the former, institutional change 
developed in three areas. First, the WHO responded to the increasing attention paid to emerging 
diseases in the 1990s by channelling resources and priorities in that direction. It stressed the 
importance of emerging diseases in its strategic plans and created a new Division of Emerging and 
Other Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control in 1995 (later changed with different 
names and structures). Second, the WHO increased its collaboration with other actors to build up a 
system of global surveillance, which relies on a variety of governmental and non-governmental 
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sources to identify potential public health emergencies of international concern. Third, the WHO 
member states adopted revised International Health Regulations in 2005, which requires them to 
provide comprehensive information to the WHO about ‘all diseases and health events that may 
constitute a public health emergency of international concern’, and to build capacities to manage the 
cross-border spread of infectious agents. 
In the early 2000s, the governments of industrial countries also agreed to a major increase in 
the funding for AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in the developing world, but decided to channel it 
through new organizations, and specifically the Global Fund, rather than the WHO or the UN 
system. 
In relation to both the reform of the WHO structures to address infectious diseases and on 
the creation and design of the Global Fund, the governments of Western countries were clearly the 
most powerful actors. While the revision process of the IHR was driven by WHO staff, the content 
of the revised regulations reflected the bargaining power of the Western government delegates. For 
instance, during the negotiations the delegates of developing countries requested an international 
transfer of resources to build the national surveillance capabilities mandated by the revised IHR, but 
no provisions to this effect were included in the final agreement.
46
 Similarly, the creation and 
design of the Global Fund reflects the preferences of the largest donors. Three decisions were of 
fundamental importance. First, large donors wanted to create a financial instrument that would 
specifically channel resources towards malaria, tuberculosis, and especially HIV/AIDS, rather than 
fund other types of interventions, such as the strengthening of primary health care services. Second, 
they wanted the new financial mechanisms to have no connection to the UN and the WHO. 
Perceived shortcomings of the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS (created in 1986) had already 
led to the establishment of UNAIDS in 1996. The UN General Assembly held a ‘Special Session on 
AIDS’ in June 2001, in which a number of institutional options for the new financing were 
discussed, but especially the United States, the European Commission, and Japan rejected the 
option of letting either the WHO or UNAIDS manage the funds.
47
 Third, the main donor 
governments wanted to avoid a classical intergovernmental model, and as a result the Global Fund 
was constituted as a non-profit foundation under the Swiss Civil Code and given an unusual 
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governance structure.
48
 The board of the Global Fund consists of ‘representatives’ of donors, 
developing countries, civil society, and the private sector, all with voting rights. 
These decisions were controversial, and ‘It was far from inevitable that NGOs, foundations 
and the private sector would be given unprecedented voting rights on the Global Fund Board.’49 
Several governments had expressed strong reservations when the UN Economic and Social Council 
approved the inclusion of NGOs as non-voting members within the UNAIDS Programme 
Coordinating Board seven years before the establishment of the Global Fund. Some developing 
countries—notably South Africa—objected to a strong presence of NGOs on the governing body of 
the Global Fund, but NGOs from developing and developed countries succeeded in presenting 
themselves as legitimate representatives of people affected by diseases and donor governments 
supported their demands.
50
 But the very decision to create a special fund for AIDS and other two 
diseases was not the preferred outcome for some governments, especially if it came with restrictions 
on how the funds had to be used. With regard to the policy of funding antiretroviral therapy, 
UNAIDS Director Peter Piot reported that at the 2001 UN General Assembly Special Session on 
AIDS: 
all donors except for France, all African countries, all Asian countries, were totally 
opposed of mentioning the word antiretroviral therapy and to have a target or a goal 
on treatment for people living with HIV and so in that declaration of commitment 
that came out of it you see only some very vague type of view and compromised 
language.
51
 
The actors with most influence on the selection and design of IOs in global health were those with 
the ability to provide substantial funding and with stronger capabilities to contain the domestic 
spread of diseases with unilateral measures: the governments of rich Western states. These are 
accountable to voters in their respective states, but generally not to people elsewhere. From the 
perspective of the all-affected principle, this dimension of policy-making suffers from a substantial 
deficit of accountability. 
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Could it be argued that the publics of Western countries exercise a form of ‘surrogate 
accountability’  on behalf of the publics of poorer countries, with the former punishing their own 
governments for decisions that the latter would have disapproved?
52
 In other words, would 
decisions on institutional design have been the same if Western governments had been accountable 
to non-Western populations? There are reasons to believe that they would not have been. There is 
some evidence to suggest that AIDS is not the top priority for citizens in the regions most affected 
by AIDS. The most thorough study has been conducted by Dionne et al.
53
 Their analysis is based on 
a range of methods and sources: the cross-national Afrobarometer survey, panels of the longitudinal 
survey in rural Malawi covered approximately 4,000 respondents, a survey of 122 village headmen, 
semi-structured interviews, and logs of conversations. These sources consistently showed a weak 
demand for AIDS resources compared to the demand for resources for other issues, specifically for 
health and development more generally. In most countries, respondents thought that additional 
resources should be devoted to other problems rather than AIDS. On average, the demand for AIDS 
services is not stronger in countries with higher HIV prevalence, nor is it significantly stronger 
among people who have lost a relative or close friend to AIDS. A panel survey in rural Malawi 
showed that AIDS ranked as the lowest priority on average, and that even HIV-positive 
respondents, who are most likely to benefit from the new resources for antiretroviral therapy, 
expressed preferences for clean water, agricultural development, and health services over additional 
AIDS services in their area. More generally, a study of twenty-seven countries by Esser and 
Keating Bench finds only a weak statistical correlation between, on the one hand, what beneficiaries 
in Africa, Latin America, and the poorer parts of Asia consider the most severe causes of ill-health 
and, on the other hand, the uses to which donors allocate pledged official development assistance 
for health.
54
 This provides indirect evidence for the conclusion that it matters who can hold global 
health policy-makers accountable. 
 
The Development and Choice of Policies and Policy Instruments 
The way in which health IOs are designed—notably their mandate, funding modalities, and 
decision-making procedures—significantly constrain the choices of decision-makers within a given 
institutional context and therefore the set of people who are most likely to be significantly affected 
by their decisions. Because of the prior decision to focus the Global Fund on three diseases, its 
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decisions are highly relevant to people living with those diseases or most at risk of contracting 
them, but less so to people whose main concerns are, for instance, respiratory illnesses. Sridhar and 
Batniji remark that ‘Even those who point to the inclusive board of the Global Fund or its country-
coordinating mechanism must acknowledge that the priorities of the Global Fund, namely 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, were included in the organisation’s mandate.’55 The mandate 
of the WHO is much wider, but it shares the accountability deficits that plague traditional 
intergovernmental organizations. WHO staff are accountable to the Director General, who is 
accountable to the members of the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly, who in turn 
are accountable to the governments of the member states that appointed them. In line with the 
intergovernmental model, governments are the only channel of accountability to affected 
communities, which creates two major sources of accountability gaps: governments may themselves 
lack democratic accountability to their populations, especially the most vulnerable people; and 
financial and other inequalities between governments influence the content of policies in ways that 
do not reflect patterns of affectedness. 
To what extent can the unusual governance structure help the Global Fund avoid such 
sources of accountability problems? Within the constraints set by its mandate and funding 
arrangements, the Board of the Global Fund (and to a lesser extent its Secretariat) retains significant 
room for manoeuvre with regard to policy choices. It exercises significant power by accepting or 
rejecting specific grant applications, but also through more general decisions, such as the balance of 
funding between the three diseases; the balance between treatment, prevention, care, and health 
system strengthening; the types of treatment regimes to be supported; whether and how to accept in-
kind donations; which entities can apply for funding; and other important aspects that can have a 
deep impact on the health of a large number of people. A Technical Review Panel (TRP) considers 
and assesses each grant proposal and its judgements have great influence on the final decision 
because the Board cannot review every proposal in detail—it accepts the recommendations of the 
TRP in 90 per cent of cases.
56
 But since the Board has the ultimate authority on grant decisions (and 
the composition of the TRP), it deserves most attention. 
The twenty voting members of the Board include seven representatives from developing 
countries (one from each of the six WHO regions and one additional representative from Africa), 
eight representatives from donors; and five representatives from civil society and the private sector. 
When decision by consensus is not possible, decisions require a two-thirds majority of those present 
of both: (a) the group encompassing the eight donor seats, one private sector seat, and one private 
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foundation seat; and (b) the group encompassing the seven developing country seats, the two NGO 
seats, and the representative of an NGO who is a person living with HIV/AIDS or from a 
community living with tuberculosis or malaria. This allows various coalitions, and not only donors, 
to block decisions. On many issues, however, a deadlock is more damaging to recipient 
governments and civil society representatives than to donor governments and the private sector. 
The governance structure of the Global Fund shows that the participation model of 
accountability has relevance not only for external observers but also for some policy-makers. The 
Framework Document that provided the constitutional foundations for the Global Fund stated that it 
‘should be a multisectoral partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and 
affected communities’.57 Having interviewed several Board members and policy-makers closely 
associated with the Global Fund, Amy Barnes and Garrett Brown found that: 
not a single participant believed that the Global Fund should only be accountable to 
one sector or group. All interviewees, without being able to clearly delineate a 
percentage or hierarchy, suggested that both shareholders and stakeholders had a 
legitimate right to demand a certain level of answerability from the Global Fund as 
an organisation.
58
 
Board members are called ‘representatives’ of ‘constituencies’. But to whom are they accountable? 
Formally, individual members of the Board are accountable to the Board as a whole, since the latter 
can remove Board members and select new members. Removal would be most likely if a member 
no longer has the confidence of his or her constituency. The accountability relationship between 
Board member and constituency varies in strength. It is strongest in the case of donor and recipient 
governments that have their own representatives on the Board. Governments with no national on the 
Board have less opportunity to sanction the representative of their constituency. Similar imbalances 
arise in relation to NGO representatives. First, Bartsch notes that there is a bias with regard to 
disease focus: ‘Board members tend to represent NGOs from the area of HIV/AIDS, and 
organizations from the areas of tuberculosis and malaria are often absent from the wider NGO 
Board delegations.’59 Second, as Bartsch notes, there is little transparency in the selection process 
for NGO representatives.
60
 Effective accountability to people living with HIV/AIDS or from a 
community living with tuberculosis or malaria is particularly weak. Finally, in relation to the 
accountability of the Board as a whole to the various constituencies, there is a widespread 
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perception of highly unequal accountability relationships: ‘In almost every case, stakeholders 
criticised the Global Fund for being too focused on and interested in remaining accountable to 
donor nations. Indeed the perception of donor favouritism was echoed by almost every interviewee 
who was not part of the Global Fund Secretariat or member of a donor country.’61  
On some decisions, the medical and scientific community could be seen as exercising a form 
of ‘surrogate accountability’ on behalf of the most affected people, through their ability to affect the 
reputation and credibility of Global Fund decision-makers. A prominent example occurred in 2004, 
when a group of malaria researchers accused the Global Fund of ‘medical malpractice’, because it 
financed the use of chloroquine and sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine, which were said to be generally 
ineffective, while it should have financed highly effective artemisinin-based combination treatments 
(ACTs).
62
 The Global Fund and the WHO issued defensive statements, but the challenge seems to 
have had a major effect:  
Four months after the Lancet piece appeared, the Global Fund held a closed-door 
meeting in Geneva. Afterwards, the organisation’s senior officials declared that 
African countries should retrospectively adjust all malaria grants awarded to specify 
ACTs. Global Fund officials estimated that the cost of this policy change would be 
more than a US$1 billion over five years.
63
  
 
Policy Implementation 
The role of health IOs in implementing their own policies can vary greatly. At one extreme, they 
may merely adopt a set of rules or standards and have no influence over whoever decides to 
implement them in a particular geographical or sectoral context. At the other extreme, the core staff 
of the IO takes responsibility for implementing the policies ‘on the ground’, for instance through 
field missions that perform surveillance tasks in areas affected by disease outbreaks. Between those 
two extremes, there are various degrees of involvement and control, and implementing actors can be 
seen at least partially as ‘agents’ of the IOs. Such agents may be formally employed by the IOs or 
critically depend on IO funds and other resources for their activities. 
Within the various constraints set by the IO’s policies, the choices made by implementing 
agents can deeply affect the lives of intended beneficiaries. An extreme case occurs when the agents 
decide to misappropriate funds and provide no services at all. So an important question is: to what 
extent are implementing agents accountable to those who are most directly affected by their 
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decisions? The latter can exercise accountability as citizens or as consumers of health services 
provided by the agents. In practice, citizenship accountability is usually exercised through 
participatory institutions and mechanisms embedded in national and local governments, and 
therefore the question of the accountability of IO agents largely coincides with the extent and 
quality of general political accountability in a country, district, or municipality. With regard to 
health-provider accountability to consumers, the question we need to ask is to what extent IO-
supported services formally incorporate accountability mechanisms and, if so, how well they work 
in practice. Unfortunately there is relatively little research on health-provider accountability to 
consumers, and even less research that singles out IO-supported programmes and projects.
64
 Some 
IOs have endorsed the norm of health-provider accountability to users.
65
 The World Bank has 
attracted much attention (and criticism) for promoting market mechanisms as a means to increase 
user accountability in the health sector, but it has also studied and applied mechanisms based on 
community participation. For instance, in a controlled experiment in India, World Bank researchers 
used meetings, posters, and hand-outs to inform poor villagers about the right to access government 
services and complaint mechanisms, and found that informed communities experienced 
improvements in mobilization and better health services compared to control communities.
66
 But 
existing research does not tell us how common accountability mechanisms are in IO-sponsored 
initiatives, or whether the participation of IOs in the design and financing of health programmes and 
projects leads to the incorporation of more accountability mechanisms than there are in comparable 
initiatives with no IO involvement. Even when the introduction of community participation 
mechanisms in IO-supported programmes and projects is documented, researchers find that their 
actual impact is limited, as in a study of eighteen World Bank-supported health sector reform 
projects.
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It should be noted that, for all the support given to consumer/user/community accountability 
in the documents of some IOs, the emphasis is still very much on upward accountability to donors. 
This priority is expressed formally in the 2001 Framework Document of the Global Fund. The 
section entitled ‘Defining accountability’ states that: 
Grantees need to be: a) accountable to government, private sector and foundation 
donors (for the use of funds, achievement of results); b) responsive to developing 
countries (to help them fight the three diseases in their countries); c) responsive to 
the needs of those infected and directly affected by the three diseases.
68
 
As Barnes and Brown note, the choice of words is revealing: grantees are formally required to be 
accountable to donors, but merely responsive to developing countries and those infected and 
directly affected by the three diseases.
69
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter argues that the research questions deserving most intense theoretical and empirical 
attention in relation to IO accountability are, first, who should be accountable to whom and, second, 
to what extent they actually are. The most persuasive answer to the first question remains some 
version of the principle that everyone who is affected by a political decision should be able to 
influence that decision. Even under conditions of global interconnectedness, this does not mean that 
everyone should have a say on any decisions taken anywhere else: decision-makers should be 
accountable to specific constituencies in proportion to the power they wield over those 
constituencies. It is hoped that the approach outlined in this chapter, and the illustrative analysis of 
global health policy here, will be useful to others who aim to answer the second question through 
empirical research that is sensitive to the complex and multifaceted ways in which power is 
exercised in global governance. 
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